I think the two videos below can represent how rhetoric is normally understood. In popular imagination, it often means "eloquent" or "passionate" and highly emotional speech. The two videos below are that of two great leaders of the present. Obama's speech selected here is eloquent but calm whereas that of Prachanda (Nepal's Prime Minister)is highly emotional. But these two speeches should not be taken as representative of these two leaders. I have chosen them only to present how rhetoric is generally understood. Though you may not understand Prachanda's speech in Nepali language, you can see the point I am trying to present.
Listening-Rhetoric is what I most long to celebrate and practice—the kind that is sadly rare. . . . Here both sides join in a trusting dispute, determined to listen to the opponent's arguments, while persuading the opponent to listen in exchange. . . . Both sides are pursuing not just victory but a new reality, a new agreement about what is real.
—Wayne C. Booth, 2004
Why does “rhetoric” evoke ideas of “manipulation,” “deception,” or “trickery”? Though many in the field of rhet/comp have tried to purge “rhetoric” from its (mis)conception as “deception,” it is commonly used to indicate a distortion of reality or truth. This characterization of rhetoric as an art of deception, ironically, has its inherent root in its popular (common) definition as “an art of persuasion.” Rhetoric is commonly understood as persuading by any means possible. In my paper I will argue that such definition needs to be radically rethought in the line of recent developments in epistemological and linguistic theories, which place massive focus on social construction of truth. Rhetoric should be defined not as an art of persuading the speaker’s vision of reality, but as an art of engaging and negotiating varying perspectives to arrive at a common agreement. And to turn this into practice, we need to free ourselves from the false notion of rhetoric as persuasion and adopt the notion of rhetoric as a discourse where speaking and listening are equally important. In the entire history of western rhetorical theory, the only (or the predominant) focus has been on the speaker, from Plato’s noble rhetoric to Rorty’s redescription, or from Aristotile’s “logos, ethos, and pathos” to Burke’s “poetic solution.” Even if audience (and context) figures in their theories, the intension is not to incorporate their (audience’s) perspectives, but to modulate the presentation of the speaker’s version of reality to make them (audience) believe it. So, the definition of rhetoric from Plato to Richard Rorty—whether foundationalist or anti-foundationalist—falls into the same category. To persuade (whether by the use of logical arguments or overwhelming emotional appeals) entails that the speaker has “truth” with him/her and s/he needs to consider audience and context to choose his/her method of presentation, style, and delivery. Even Burkean and Rortian ideas of identification unknowingly retain this tendency: that the speaker is the source of knowledge or truth. However, in Wayne Booth’s notion of “listening-rhetoric” (or deep listening) and Christa Ratcliff’s “rhetorical listening,” we find some shift in focus from traditional emphasis on speaking to an integration of listening into the scope of rhetoric.
So, in this paper, following Berlin’s division of rhetorical theory into three main categories (after the combination of two into one), I will first present how all these theories share the same tendency in the definition of rhetoric though there are several differences. Then I will move to some other people who have directly or indirectly discussed about rhetoric in terms of “listening,” “conversation,” “negotiation,” or “dialogue.” Then the third part will be how we can draw some important message to the teaching of composition from this recognition of rhetoric as negotiation.
Expressivist (Plato)
As Berlin says, the expressivist theory of rhetoric has its root in Plato’s scheme of ideas where “truth is discovered through an internal apprehension, a private vision of a world that transcends the physical” (771). Here the speaker holds the truth and the only job of him is to bring it out and to present it to the audience in the way that suits their intellectual level. If we have to capture Plato’s notion of rhetoric precisely, it is “a necessary evil” as dialectic, even if it can discover truth, is ineffectual and powerless to convince people about truth. So, dialectic needs rhetoric to establish truth already possessed by the speaker. In “Phaedrus,” Socrates says: ““Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul” (163). When he comes to his later part of his theorization of rhetoric we can find him being aware of the importance of rhetoric and the need to consider kairos and audience. In Phaedrus, Plato presents his notion of kairos “Rather he [rhetorician] should catalog the kinds of human soul so that he can adapt his discourse to whomever he addresses. This is Socrates’ version of kairos” (Bizzel and Herzberg 85). Socrates further says: “Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So, men of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life” (163). Thus it is quite explicit that for Plato a rhetorician must be aware of different contexts and audiences so that he can move them to action. The knowledge of audience does not mean accommodating their ideas. By knowing about the “level” or “kinds” of audience, the rhetor can persuade them.
There is some problem in Plato’s notion of rhetoric. For him, the noble rhetorician presents truth differently to different audience. Then one problem arises, if the noble rhetorician already has a truth and needs to present that differently, he needs to express truth plus something. And that something makes it something more than or less than truth, or by virtue of being so, noble rhetorician also presents untruth or manipulation of truth. This is what Duffy and Jacobi say while analyzing Weaver’s argument about rhetoric as “truth plus its artful presentation”: “since if rhetoric consists of truth plus something else, the ‘something else’ must be other than truth. In effect, this definition of rhetoric separates dialectic from presentation and opens the door to abuses of and through rhetoric” (Duffy and Jacobi 111). Then what comes true about Plato is that 1. Speaker (individual) holds truth; 2. He needs rhetoric to persuade truth to different audience; 3. Rhetoric is a manipulation of truth in one form or the other.
Positivists/Traditionalists (Aristotle)
The positivist or traditionalist definition of rhetoric has its root in Aristotle. Unlike Platonic or expressivist theory, Aristotleans believe that truth exists in the material world outside language and it is accessible through language: “Reality for Aristotle can thus be known and communicated, with language serving as the unproblematic medium of discourse. There is an uncomplicated correspondence between the sign and the thing, and – once again emphasizing the rational – the process whereby sign and thing are united is considered a mental act: words are not a part of the external world, but both word and thing are a part of thought” (Berlin 767). However, Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric shares a lot with Plato in terms of its focus on “speaker” and the consideration of audience and contexts. Let’s analyze Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric: “rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (181). Rhetoric in this definition is finding appropriate and available means of persuasion in a particular situation (case). Here available also suggests that rhetorical means are situation-specific and demand the speaker to be able to understand audience, unique location, and circumstances. Context determines what kind of personality to construct, what sorts of emotional appeals to use.
In this definition of rhetoric, “rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (181), the “available means of persuasion” are the three “appeals” that Aristotle recommends the rhetoricians, that of ethos, logos, and pathos. Here is Aristotle’s rhetorical triangle:
Since these three elements are used to persuade or overwhelm the audience, I prefer to represent them as three prongs of a trident used to destroy the views and opinions of the audience. It is another way of presenting rhetorical triangle.
The effective use of these three “bullets” or a three-pronged weapon can easily overwhelm the audience and establish the speaker’s notion of truth. Though Aristotle emphasizes on logos, he does not belittle the value of “pathos,” as he claims, due to the “imperfection” of the audience. That is why they are taken as three “appeals.” Let’s see the use of the trident in terms of appeals:
See the visual rhetoric. Consider, the vector created by her gaze, and the potential target of her eyes. And the vector created by the trident also has the same target. What does the use of red color on her lips and on the trident symbolize? It is inviting, but to drive the trident into your heart. The three arrows can be taken as Aristotle’s three appeals: logos, pathos, and ethos, all powerful but dangerous. ( the issue of the use of a female body is really important, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper). The purpose of a rhetorical discourse is to kill the audience virtually, overwhelming them to follow the speaker’s notion of truth by any means possible.
In Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric there is no trace of negotiation. Nor is there listening as an important aspect. By “focus on listening”, I don’t mean listening by listeners, rather I am focusing on listening by the speaker. Therefore, the point is that speaking should never be severed from the need to listen to the interlocutors. This notion of rhetoric as a two way transaction cannot be found anywhere in Aristotle’s theory.
Is Aristotle different from Plato in this regard. Not at all. We can find several resonances of Plato in Aristotle. First, there is a clear cut division between rhetoric and dialectic, one dealing with the probable and the other dialectic. Second, in Aristotle too, the source of “truth” is the speaker. Third, the emphasis on pathos due to the imperfection of the audience correspond to Plato’s emphasis on the need of blending dialectic with rhetoric (appeals) to meet the expectation of different audience (souls). So, in both of them, the speaker is supposed to possess truth (though in case of Aristotle, it is probable truth), which he needs to establish through proper use of different appeals.
New Rhetoric (Burke and Rorty)
The focus of new rhetoric is on social construction of “truth.” In this respect, the advocates of this approach are fundamentally different from the foundationalists like Plato or Aristotle. They believe in the impossibility of anything with CAPITAL LETTERS: Truth, Knowledge, or Essence. Everything is contextual and contingent, including one’s own identity (Descartes’ Ego or I). Burke comes up with his notion of “terministic screens” or “orientation,” Rorty with “alternative vocabulary,” and Foucault with “discourse” (there are a host of other such terms).
Burke is taken to be the father of new rhetoric. He challenges foundationalism and advocates multiplicity of truth based on “terministic screens” through which the world is seen by everyone. But he is equally aware that some common ground is necessary to avoid “the confusion due to a welter of solutions” (Permanence and Change 167). He offers a poetic solution that is based on cooperation rather than competition: “we have no option than to build our own culture by huddling together” (272). One important shift in Burke is from the focus of rhetoric (not excluded from poetics) on conquering to cooperation. However, his idea of poetic identification has another problem: that great poets offer solution and the others have to follow them. Though he is aware that poetic solutions are also ethical (biased), his emphasis on identification precludes negotiation, which is different from competitiveness. This is what Ratcliff says while talking about Burke’s notion of identification in terms of rhetorical listening: “As a place of common ground, Burke’s identification demands that differences be bridged. The danger of such a move is that differences and their possibilities, when bridged, may be displaced and mystified” (53).
The same problem surfaces in Rorty. Like Burke, Rorty is a thorough anti-foundationalist. He clearly contends: “To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations” (Contingency 5). Though he advocates redescriptions, he admits that every new system of beliefs (redescription) becomes nothing more than a replacement of one contingent system by the other similarly so instead of the second moving closer to truth or representing truth. Rorty says: “It thereby became possible to see a new vocabulary not as something which was supposed to replace all other vocabularies, something which claimed to represent reality, but simply as one more vocabulary, one more human project, and one person’s chosen metaphoric” (Contingency 39). This clearly shows the complete difference between foundationalist ideas of Plato and Aristotle and that of Rorty.
He regards everything contingent, including imaginative identification, which he sees as a solution to the “welter of confusions” that can result from the disarray among different orientations or ideologies/vocabularies. His unique feature is the blend of anti-foundationalist ironism and poetic/imaginative identification generated through great works of art. However, this emphasis on identification over negotiation is what makes him move closer to Platonism. His emphasis on “solidarity” generated through imaginative identification is all based on “pathos.”
Thus in both Burke and Rorty, we can find an immense emphasis on “rhetoric as persuasion” through the use of “emotion” or “pathos,” though they use different terms. In both of them, we find a clear break from either Platonic or Aristotlean foundationalism. However, their emphasis on poetic solution has a clear correspondence to Platonic or Aristotlian emphasis on pathos. Their point is that argument does not work and it is only through “identification” we can create common ground. This tendency is the result of the influence of Western emphasis on “rhetoric as persuasion.” They ignore an equal possibility of understanding it as negotiation. Though they are completely aware of the existence of multiple ideologies and belief systems, their idea of identification ignores differences and overemphasizes commonality. I agree with them that some sort of common ground is necessary, however, that should at the same time recognize differences. Common ground should not be that of the one group (an individual), rather it should be the product of, in Habermassian term, a domination-free communication or conversation. The speaker should listen to the listeners’ discourses too. I believe, instead of poetic inducement, a focus on Booth’s notion of “deep listening” can generate common ground among different perspectives.
Alternative Definition of Rhetoric (Booth and Ratcliff)
In this direction, we can extend Booth’s notion of “deep listening” or “listening rhetoric”:
I thus hope that it will be useful to introduce a third term, covering those rhetors and rhetoricians who see their center as not how to persuade effectively but how to practice listening-rhetoric (LR) at the deepest possible level. When LR is pushed to its fullest possibilities, opponents in any controversy listen to each other not only to persuade better but also to find the common ground behind the conflict. They pursue the shared assumptions (beliefs, faiths, warrants, commonplaces) that both sides depend on as they pursue their attacks and disagreements. (10)
Here, Booth’s notion of listening rhetoric is significant as it replaces the wrong focus on persuading the targeted audience by any means to listening their voices to find common ground. So, the purpose here is to avoid conflict rather than to establish one version of reality over the other through the use of “all available means.” We can mitigate misunderstanding by “listening to the other side, and then listening even harder to one’s own responses” (Booth 21). Booth further says: “Even though rhetoric will never have a single definition, and even though conflicting domains will always frustrate our efforts to communicate, there are ways to escape, in every corner of our lives, the popular degradations of rhetoric. Practice LR!” (21)
In a different context, Ratcliff also has a similar notion of rhetoric. Though she is writing from a feminist point of view, she has offered a number of insights that can be very useful in general too. Here is what she says about the neglect of listening: “A second disciplinary bias that explains our neglect of listening is that Western rhetorical theories themselves have traditionally slighted listening. Classical rhetorical theories forground rhetor’s speaking and writing as means of persuading audiences; these theories are only secondarily concerned with how audiences should listen and hardly at all concerned with what Ballif calls the desires of particular audience members” (20).
I believe this shift in focus from rhetoric as persuasion to rhetoric as negotiation; from an overemphasis on “speaking” to an equal consideration to “listening” can improve communication. This may also help brush out the negative connotation of rhetoric. Here, ethos, pathos, and logos are equally important, however, they acquire different meaning. They should be made to respect and integrate the values of both the sides ( Crusius and Channell 298).
Rhetoric in the Classroom
This redefinition of rhetoric can have important bearings upon teaching of composition. It not only calls the teachers to relinquish authority, but also encourages students to both speak out their opinions and to negotiate them with that of their friends and their instructor. I think collaborative approach is the one that seems to accommodate this notion. However, in practice it has not made a real change. We still urge students to “control the meaning” (Berthoff), or to make students master of their own ideas. The rhetoric behind this is that of conquering rather than negotiating. Even in the social constructionist theories, the focus seems to be on plurality of truths. My point here is that we need to move one step ahead and underscore the need of building common ground through meaningful negotiation among multiple perspectives. For this purpose, mere respect for plurality is not sufficient. Rather, those who advocate their own perspectives or orientations, should also be ready to “listen to” the other points of view.
Here, I do not mean that students should not make passionate and reasoned argument. However, what I mean is that they should be instructed to see the arguments of their peers too. As a practical strategy to incorporate this notion, we can think of incorporating written responses in the class discussion. For this, some good options (as far as I know) can be incorporating blogs and wikis into class discussion. We can make students post one entry for every class and tell them to comment on at least one of their friends’ posts. Here, the focus is not on making students prove their point in any way possible. But it is to make them work together with their classmates to see how they can form common opinion. Students can be asked to appreciate their peers’ writing in terms of their arguments and reflect upon their own writing. Here, they become listener of not only their peers but also their own discourses. This is what Booth means by deep listening. This can help improve one’s own argument and similarly can strengthen collaboration.
Works Cited
Aristotle. “The Rhetoric.” Bizzel and Herzberg 179-240.
Berlin, James A. “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories.” College English 44.2 (December 1982): 765-777.
Berthoff, Anne E. “Is Teaching Still Possible?: Writing, Meaning, and Higher Order Reasoning.” Cross-Talk in Comp Theory. Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English, 2003. 743-756.
Bizzel, Patricia, and Bruce Herzberg, eds. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. 2nd Ed. Boston: Bedford Books/St. Martin, 2001.
Booth, Wayne C. Rhetoric of RHETORIC. MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Burke, Edmund. Permanence and Change. 3rd ed. California: University of California Press, 1984.
Crusius, Timothy W, and Carolyn E. Channell. The Aims of Argument: A Text and Reader. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2006.
Duffy, Bernard K, and Martin Jacobi. The Politics of Rhetoric: Richard M. Weaver and the Conservative Tradition. CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Plato. “Phaedrus.” Bizzel and Herzberg 138-168.
Ratcliffe, Krista. Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, and Whiteness. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005.
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
